This paper, part of a larger project on governance and growth in Russia, examines regional financial resilience in Russia in the period following the global financial crisis. The level of risk is rising, as government emergency finance is withdrawn and regions face rising debt to cover even operational expenses, but "resource" regions seem securely well off, despite having been most affected by the financial crisis. This paper examines one region, KhantyMansiysk autonomous okrug (KhMAO), the largest "donor" to the federal budget, against the background of other mineral resource abundant regions. It traces developments since the dramatic budget reforms (late 1990s through 2005), including centralization of revenues and rationalized program expenditure (Alexeev and Weber 2013). It assesses regional budget and debt management in response to pressures from increased federal required expenditures, postcrisis withdrawal of subsidies, and the roll-out of new debt guidelines. It describes and explains KhMAO's stability and relative autonomy in these crisis conditions. The key questions are: Why are these "donor" regions, more affected by the crisis than others, also more resilient? Is Russia's growth core of regions financially stable because of federal intervention? How vulnerable is the resource region to future oil price shocks? Our findings are tentative, since there remain questions about transparency and soft budget constraints (Plekhanov 2006) . We show federalism at its most cooperative: among other factors, regional collaborative action fosters flexible budgeting.
Introduction
This paper, part of a larger project on governance and growth in Russia, examines regional financial resilience in Russia in the period following the global financial crisis. The level of risk is rising, as government emergency finance is withdrawn and regions face rising debt to cover even operational expenses, but "resource" regions seem securely well off, despite having been most affected by the financial crisis. This paper examines one region, KhantyMansiysk autonomous okrug (KhMAO), the largest "donor" to the federal budget, against the background of other mineral resource abundant regions. It traces developments since the at both budget and credit management, however, it is important to observe and ask why, in regions of greatest growth potential, regional finance is so secure. It is in these "donor" regions, which were more affected by the crisis than others, that there is greater resilience in the medium term. Is Russia's growth core of regions financially stable because of federal intervention? How vulnerable is the resource region to future oil price shocks? Our findings are tenative, since there remain questions about transparency and soft budget constraints (Plekhanov 2006 ). We shows federalism at its most cooperative: neighboring regional action fosters growth and stability.
We use a case study approach for a number of reasons. Most important, although there is a considerable quantitative literature on Russia's fiscal federal system, as pointed out, we aim on a smaller scale to combine a study of budget and credit management with a closer look at a representative example in a particular group of regions.
A case study approach is widely used for conceptual clarification prior to and during statistical analyses of large data bases (Eisenhardt 1989 , Ragin and Becker 1992 , Geddes 2003 , Gerring 2007 . A case study isolates for closer examination either extremes in a trend, or a typical case. Since we examine the growth process and not, for example, inequality, we explore regional finance in a territory especially vulnerable in its growth potential and not its general economic state.
The paper is organized as follows. The case study, broken down by sub-section, is in part 3. The introduction is followed by a review of the large literature on fiscal federalism, with emphasis on analysis appropriate to oil abundant federations. This sets a foundation for looking at KhMAO in comparative context. Russia's fiscal federalism is of scholarly interest within and beyond the borders of Russia in large part because of intense and continuing effective reform through the 2010s, improving the delivery of both equity and efficiency. We use this literature about ongoing centralizing reform, however, to the continuing diversity still apparent in regional finance and regulatory regimes across the enormous country (Commander, Plekhanov et al. 2013 ). We note in conclusion the importance of cooperation as well as competition among oil abundant regions, although exploring in any detail is beyond the scope of our research. The final section is a conclusion.
Literature Review: Fiscal Rigidity in Russia
There is wide agreement among researchers about fiscal rigidity on the revenue side of and other allocations, in turn partially allocated to districts and municipalities. 5 Local government provides services in health, education and social welfare (Searle 2007 The important constraint is not the collection of revenues but the access to them through shared spending authority. The spending side, for all regions, has been pressed by President
Putin's "May 7 decrees" in 2012, guaranteeing a standard of services, including a pay raise for government staff, and the provision of benefits to all citizens. To be sure, these decrees were not only a constraint but a benefit, promising greater efficiency, reduction of duplication and waste, monitoring of implementation of federal programs. 7 Rigidity in the budget process, however, as (Qian and Weingast 1997 ).
An incentive orientation, in its largest significance, is an argument for decentralization that among advanced countries has mostly replaced the former "cooperative fiscal federalism" as the dominant approach to intergovernmental relations (Musgrave 1997 Thus centralizing budget reform continues. The historical and current regional revenue and expenditure system is described in detail in numerous articles (Siluanov, Kadochnikov et al. The results are as follows: 100 percent of the VAT was recentralized (in the 1990s), along with 80% of the oil and gas extraction tax, leaving by 2012 one quarter of the revenue base of regions from the corporate profit tax (including on resource industries) and personal income tax (28%), approximately the same percentages regional revenues from these sources in Canada.
The property tax represents, on average, some 9% of regional revenues (2011), amounting to 1.9 7 % of GRP, roughly in line with property taxes elsewhere. 12 Total regional tax revenues in Russia amount to roughly 11% of GRP (Siluanov, Kadochnikov et al. 2009 , Vartapetov 2010 , again, comparable to other states (Canada, 12.1%, Australia, 4%; Germany, 7.9%; and the US, 5%) 13 .
As in other countries, expenditures are allocated by equalization grants (mainly for balancing the budget), earmarked grants (including unconditional grants for center delegated spending (subventions) and earmarked matching grants (subsidies) for priority federal programs, and compensation grants to adjust distribution of these allocations (Vartapetov 2011 ).
The main result of these reforms, we argue, is considerable standardization of Russia's budget process. Budget centralization, arguably, is too often assumed to be synonymous with political recentralization. Instead, some recentralization has been a natural evolution in Russian 8 resources that is missing in Russia's regional budgets. Also, Canada removes restrictions on how provinces can raise money, and the federal level has taken over the unemployment program. In Canada, mineral resource abundant regions thus have considerably more autonomy than in the Russian Federation. Even so, all of these federations experience political pressure from provinces, some favoring more autonomy and some, more equalization.
To continue, it is especially where endowments are uneven, as in Canada, Russia and
Australia, that most taxes on energy production and export collected at the federal level, since the federal level can better absorb the uncertainty and volatility of oil prices. Searle (2007, p. 11) summarizes: "the usual starting point in an allocation of revenue sources between levels of government is that the level with the greatest fiscal capacity has the best tools for overcoming fluctuations in revenue collections." In this regard, taking oil extraction revenues away from the regions is a preferred option: it promises to incentivize more efficient use of the profit, or corporate income, tax, to diversify expenditures (Cottarelli, 2012) . With oil, the aim is to mitigate the threat of a regional "curse," a phenomenon having a political aspect, where services at comparable taxation and providing "insurance" for region-specific shocks. 15 In regard to spending, similarly, Russia's federation provides a range of transfer amounts:
in 2012, for example, in Russia, officially recorded transfers from the federal to regional level averaged 20.8% of total income, but the range was 86.4% (Republic of Ingushetia) to 4.9 % (Khanty-Mansiysk autonomous okrug). 16 Among sources of support during the crisis for the regions in Russia has been the Fund for Financial Support to regions with high deficits, and for social expenditures. It is difficult to determine the "system" of allocations: rules exist, but they are not always public information (Siluanov, Kadochnikov et al. 2009 , Vartapetov 2010 . IN general, these transfers consist of: (1) equalization grants, or formula-based grants aimed building capacity to deliver country-wide a standard level of services; (2) earmarked unconditional grants to finance center-delegated spending and earmarked matching grants designed to co-finance regional expenditures the federal government considers important; and (3) compensation grants, or one time unconditional grants adjust above allocations (Vartapetov 2011 ).
The rigidity of recent decline in subsidies following the end of financial crisis is not a 9 specifically "Russian" phenomenon. Even in advanced economies, it is no easy matter to demonstrate that decentralization is effective in producing growth (Iimi 2005 , p. 449). KhMAO seems one of those few regions (some 30% in the EU) likely to use transfers to promote growth:
normally this kind of effect is only expected where human capital is significant and institutions are strong. 17 In such economies, decentralized decision-making primarily is used to build community-government relations. However, the impact on growth is uncertain (Allers and Ishemoi 2011). 18 In Russia, equalization is aimed to resolve both the inadequacy of some territorial administration in the post-Soviet era as well as deeply embedded informal networks that do, indeed, allow "rentier" regions (those with mineral resource abundance) to still derive some rent revenue from "explicit and implicit taxation of extraction of mineral resources, primarily oil and gas" (Desai, Freinkman et By 2011, it was evident that fiscal regimes in the regions had successfully passed the "stress test" of the financial crisis (Vartapetov 2011) . By 2013, the funds extended during the crisis were dramatically cut back incomes of regional budgets for the first 8 months of 2013, transfers were 7% lower than in the previous year; corporate income tax also fell by 20% less. 20 Regions were encouraged to rely on credit to cover deficits. Regions (and municipalities) began borrowing more heavily, albeit within strict limits, and some regions were allowed to do In regard to public administration, budgets are fragile because they are dependent on the profit tax. The budget of KhMAO in 2012, this tax formed 40.6%, and in 2013-2015, 43.5% of okrug revenues. 23 The extent of revenues from the profit and income tax is characteristic for "resource regions," characterized by a significant endowment of globally traded natural resources, unusually adverse natural and climatic conditions creating high transport costs; steep infrastructure (including transportation) requirements for production; low population density and extensive casual migrant labor. An exacting taxonomy is debated, but most simply, they are a 21 The Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation recommended that regional allocations from taxes be increased in percent, that only regions be allowed to establish tax exemptions for firms (a loss in 2012 of some 200 bln rubles to the regions from federal regulations), and that-as soon as the cadastral survey was complete-that individual property tax on expensive real estate be raised. p. 87.
Compiled from statistical yearbook "Regions of Russia. Socio-economic indicators. 2012" (Federal state statistics service) by Evgenij Plisetskij
For our budget comparisons for Khanty-Mansiysk, we select among them 8 regions with production of oil and gas at over 40% of total GRP 24 , as in Table 1 below. 24 The All of these regions have a substantially larger than average per capita income-for KhMAO, for example, living standards are even potentially higher than in Moscow city. Located within but not completely included in Tiumen' oblast'-KhMAO is a so-called "composite region", along with Yamalo-Nenets-it retains some autonomy although provides to Tiumen' some revenues for this special arrangement. KhMAO is among seven regions (including Moscow and St Petersburg) at an investment-grade rating, with two rating agencies, permitted, in principle, to obtain funds in international capital markets, where interest rates are considerably lower (8-10%) and repayment extends over a longer period (3-5 years). KhMAO is among three regions actually doing so. 25 The following Table 2 shows its relatively high standard-of-living at a level between that of Moscow city and that of the rest of Russia: 
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Population trends are stable in KhMAO, despite a relative decline in oil extraction, as shown below in Figure 2 . Among these regions, KhMAO is the leader. Among implications of this position is the profit tax from the oil and gas sector, making up some 95% of KhMAO operating income in 2012. Taxes of the major oil and gas companies comprised 52.1% of total revenue in 2012 (51.5 % in 2011). 27 Falling extraction at major fields and a dip in the share of oil in GRP to less than half (43.6%) is a cause of concern, but it will barely dent KhMAO's leading position among the regions and in the world. Indeed, in the longer run, investment will no doubt reverse this trend.
Here is the forecast: by 2030, according to the region's Energy Strategy to 2030, annual production of oil will fall at a minimum from 260 to 222 million tons, and more likely, to 196 mt, as costs of extraction increase due to flooding and technological challenges. 28 It is not that technologies are unavailable-this is a global industry. It is that these technologies, hydraulic fracturing , horizontal drilling , three-dimensional seismic modeling, are especially costly in the initial stages. Thus arises pressure on the region to enhance investments, attract exploration, and take measures to insure economic well being under volatile price conditions. There is little chance of such a threat exceeding Russia's capacity to solve it: these concerns attract as a priority cooperation of regional governors and ministry officials and past and representatives of the oil companies, who meet informally as a " Board of Directors of Ugra", discussing, 14 essentially, policy options for the country as well as the region. 
Background: Post-Crisis Finance in Russia's Regions
There is a general optimism about long run regional growth, as expressed at Davos 2014. 30 At the same time, however, accumulating regional government debt in the short term is also of widespread public concern. 31 amounted to 1.335 trillion rubles. Similarly, S&P flagged its concern. Ministry viewpoints were "excessively optimistic," it wrote; a decline in the profit tax cast doubt on Ministry forecasts of 8-10% growth of regional revenues over 2014-2016. "The regional deficit will rise to 3 trln rubles more than planned, double the current amount." It goes on, "the regional gap will widen and in half of the regions, debt will exceed 60% of operational income (as it does now in 15 regions), and average debt service will reach 10% of revenues and in half of the regions, over 15%." 
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It should be noted that these averages have ambiguous meaning. The wealthiest regions have most of the outstanding regional bonds: Moscow, Krasnoyarsk, Nizhnyi Novgorod, Samara and Moscow oblasts (64%), regions that can easily cover obligations. 34 Also, the term structure of obligations and debt service matter. 35 Russia's debt service is high, about 10% of revenues compares in the US to an average of 5%, the ceiling for state debt, although many states have debt one or 2 percent more. 36 To what extent is debt a concern for the region in this case study?
KhMAO in 2014
Resource regions have a low level of debt to income, far less than the average than 10% of income.
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The budget and debt data for Khanty-Mansiysk (2005 provided in the Appendix, Tables 1 and 3 , allow comparisons, and these similarities show up among the well-off resource regions. This better than total debt figures on average for all regions in the country, but even these are low by international comparisons. 38 One or two regions are in great difficulty; most resource regions, including KhMAO, have weathered a difficult period without running into too much debt.
Appendix, Table1, also shows that reforms have brought total revenue shares of each category of tax for these regions increasingly into conformity. They are within a narrow range in the years after 2005. In one area, greater or less income are still derived from transfers from the federal level; in this regard, Orenburg and Sakha differ substantially from KhMAO, which derives a very small percent of its budget from transfers.
In regard to the ratio considered by Fitch as critical in regard to rigidity, the ratio of economic spending to total expenses of the consolidated budgets 39 , in the Appendix, Table 2, in 16 In summarizing the significance of the example of KhMAO, among resource regions, it is important to return to the impact of the crisis and the resilience afterward. The profit and income tax fell, in some regions (Chelyabinsk and Kemerovo) by 90%. The well off resource regions, including KhMAO, suffered most . Meanwhile, other regions, which had generous federal support, experienced no impact of the crisis. After recovery, the regions with now diminishing support from the center were in a worse position than those affected, where the liquidity of banks quickly recovered and oil and gas firms' profits rose, once again for the resource regions.
Priorities for 2014-2016 for KhMAO were ambitious, including repeated assurances of fulfilling the May decrees of 2012 and the creation of a fund for capital investment. Tax objectives for KhMAO are aligned with federal interest and long-run modernization and diversification; significant property tax breaks are now given to small and medium size enterprises, to incubators that promote them, to non-profits with socially oriented objectives, to production that reduces environmental risk, to organizations that rent property for affordable housing, and to firms producing gas by fracking. 40 Even more ambitious is the effort among resource regions to increase the share of corporate taxes allocated to regions (of the 20% tax, 2%
is currently given to the federal government); a broad lobbying effort including Urals and Siberian governors has led to a law giving the regions the entire 20%, which is making its way through the Russian parliament. 41 Bargaining and informal arrangements (public/private and intergovernmental) are notoriously difficult to follow, as some regions seek amendments to legislation. 42 It is at the level of the region and blocks of regions that tax policies of enormous importance are made. The case of one resource region cannot be convincing of the overall dynamic. However, although this study shows that there will be no likely slimming of federal programs, and that federal guidelines are prominent among Regional tax and budget documents preparing for the long-run budget, this is not the whole story. 42 The informal power of local elites is a classical concept in political science from Dahl, R. A. (1961) . Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city. New Haven,, Yale University Press.. However, advanced economies have tended to promote transparency as a main goal; in Russia, the budget process scarcely restrains the power of interests at the regional level and, particularly, in discretionary parts of federal finance. See Diversifying Russia (2013).
Conclusion
There is a major EU investigative effort to discover factors in regional resilience, as illustrated in a one report (October 2012, the European Commission's brief on 'The EU approach to resilience'), which will be developed into an EC action plan. This paper has focused on budgetary resilience in some of the regions hardest hit by the recent financial crisis (2008) (2009) ). The budget for these years in the context of the medium run shows that these donor regions suffered a temporary decline in income (substantial fall in corporate and personal income tax receipts) and without taking on much credit, reestablished surplus budgets while also covering the new 2012 requirements of increased salaries and other obligations announced in President Putin's "May decrees". The resilience of most of these regions was due in the short run to two main factors: the lack of dependence before the crisis on budgetary subsidies, whose reduction within a few years after the crisis had, therefore, almost no effect, and relative rapid restoration of adequate receipts from the CIT.
In the longer run, the resilience of resource regions, such as KhMAO, with their overall steady growth, despite volatility in oil prices, arguably is due geopolitical factors, which attract energy producers and industrial giants other than in the oil sector, and the business environemnt, including steady maintenance of a higher standard of living and skills attracted in new clusters, which are supported by innovation-oriented budgets. The findings here, however, also include, even more fundamentally, an evolving cooperative federalist agenda, with groups of regions acting together to secure negotiated decisions on tax allocations and spending requirements.
Supportive of the conclusion in Chebankova (2008) , the term adaptive federalism applies to finance, and compels a rethinking of the concept of fiscal rigidity as applied to the Russian Federation. 
